This claim is hardly met by pointing out that such terms depend in their meaning on a subjective ground in the mind.” It has often been suggested, and not without good reason, that Abelard’s view is comparable to that of John of Salisbury (1115-1180), termed “conceptualism” (Deely 2010: Medieval Philosophy Redefined, 132) wherein: “the mind recognizes the same or similar characteristics in different individual objects and conveniently gathers these differences into one mental concept or idea, which provides the meaning for the universal or general term, the spoken sound or written character string with which the concept is then associated.” While this may not be as harsh as the flatus vocis of Roscelin, it hardly resolves the challenge which nominalism poses that is, (Deely 2010: 133): “The claim of nominalism is that there is no direct referent, no proper significate, for general terms on the side of the object as thing. Abelard’s own view was far more subtle than the views of his teachers–Roscelin holding that a universal word is a flatus vocis (which you might legitimately translate as “verbal fart”) signifying no object, and Champeaux holding that individuals are possessed by the whole of their universals and yet because the relative paucity of Abelard’s extant writings, as well as their nature (generally, commentaries or glosses on the works of others), precisely characterizing his view remains a challenge. Maurer 1962: Medieval Philosophy: An Introduction, 61-65). Roscelin was challenged, but poorly, by William of Champeaux (c.1070-1130) both were countered by a common student of theirs, Peter Abelard (c.1079-1142 – of “Abelard and Heloise” fame cf. The most notable, well-known of the nominalists, living in the the later years of the “High Middle Ages”, was William of Ockham (c.1287-1349).īut nominalism–the rejection that there exists a cognition-independent reality to universals–had a first “florescence” some 250 years prior to Ockham, evidently instigated by Jean Roscelin (c.1050-1120). While the Greek and Islamic philosophers influencing the Latins generally held for some identity of thought and thing, some of the Latins demurred: the so-called nominalists, who held that the supposed universals are mere “names” (in Latin, nomina, hence, nominalists). The Greek philosophy of antiquity, and its transmission into the Latin Age by Boethius and through the Islamic tradition, had long discussed the question of whether the way in which we know things–universally (as, I don’t just have cognition of this or that human, but know humanity)–has a direct and immediate correspondent in the objects we encounter in the world–particulars–and how that relation worked. One of the most serious and extensive controversies of the Latin Age of philosophy was that of universals.

William of ockham nominalism